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INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION: NAFTA AND
GUATEMALA, TWO CASE STUDIES
Lance Compa"
INTRODUCTION
Worker rights advocates in trade unions, human rights groups, and

other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an increasingly important role in promoting internationally established fair labor
standards as a factor in international trade.' Particularly in the United
States, recent developments have widened the scope for action on labor
rights in a transnational economy.' Advocates of international fair labor
standards have challenged the traditional right of countries to address
their labor laws and labor relations as solely internal matters? They

have sought to constrain the right of multinational corporations to imple*ment labor policies based solely upon the laws of each nation where

they operate, especially where laws are designed to repress rather than
protect workers,4 and provide a competitive edge in international trade.'

* Director, International Labor Rights Advocates. a legal project of the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund; Lecturer, Yale School of Organization and Management.
1. See JOHN CAVANAGH El AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS EDUCATION

AND RESEARCH FUND, TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING
WORLD ECONOMY 41-43 (1988) [hereinafter TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS] (explaining the

origins of the promotion of worker rights in international trade); see generally UNrrE
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (Stephen Herzenberg & Jorge F. Perez-Lopez eds., 1990) [herein-

after LABOR STANDARDS] (providing a comprehensive introduction to issues of worker
rights in global trade); Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L REV. 31 (1989) (analyziag and defending international labor rights advocacy).
2. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 42.
3. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 54-59 (recommending increased
publication of foreign labor rights violations and the consideration of these violations
when the United States conducts trade negotiations).
4. See TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at 2840 (reviewing repressive
labor laws and practices in Haiti, Chile, South Korea, Guatemala, Taiwan, and South
Africa).
5. Rep. Don J. Pease, Preface to TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 1, at viii
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Opponents of international fair labor standards contend that each nation has the sovereign right to order its labor relations in accordance
with domestic economic policies and development strategies.6 Most labor laws reflect this domestic approach.7 United States domestic regulations and laws, for example, regulate union organizing, collective bargaining, and other features of labor-management relations, and also set
wage and hour levels, occupational safety and health rules, and other
minimum workplace standards.
As the United States has applied worker rights provisions of its trade
laws to other countries, some leaders in those countries have responded
with charges that the United States acts hypocritically.8 They further
contend that the United States Government fails to ratify most of the

Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)9 and is

(arguing that countries which trade with the United States and deny basic labor rights
to their citizens are engaging in unfair competition). Labor rights advocates argue that
countries and corporations can gain a competitive advantage by employing "social
dumping" tactics, such as banning strikes or independent union organizing, holding
wages below a genuinely fair return on the workers' productivity, or permitting forced
labor or child labor. Id.
6. See Gary S. Fields, Labor Standards, Economic Development and International Trade, in LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 19, 31-32 (stating that raising
trade-linked international labor standards may conflict with a country's economic objectives and likely will protect one part of the workforce at the expense of another).
7. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957)
(declaring that United States labor law "is concerned with industrial strife between
American employers and employees"). In Benz, the Supreme Court held that the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 did not cover labor disputes between a
foreign ship and its foreign crew and dismissed a claim by a foreign sailor to enforce
worker rights under United States law while in a United States port. Id.
8. See Karl Schoenberger, The Model Here Isn't America, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1992, at Al (quoting Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's statement to a
group of American businessmen that "[t]he hedonistic materialism of present (Western)
models [of development] is not for us."); see also Paul Lewis, Splits May Dampen
Rights Conference; Some Standards Don't Apply to Third World, It Says, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1993, at Al, A14 (reporting statements that "different cultures have different
human rights standards while insisting that developing countries also have an absolute
right to assistance with their economic development").
9. See EDWARD POTTER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICES OF RATIFI-

CATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS No. 87 AND No. 98 (1984). A

specialized agency of

the United Nations, the ILO is the principal multilateral body devoted to labor rights
and labor standards. While its conventions and recommendations reflect consensus
among government, employer, and trade union representatives to annual ILO conferences, the ILO has no power to enforce the standards that it sets. See Stephen I.
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itself guilty of widespread labor rights violations."
Labor rights advocates in the United States and allied organizations
abroad attempting to establish international fair labor standards run up
against traditional notions of sovereignty in formulating national labor
policies and development strategies. In the same way that entrenched
sovereignty principles gradually yielded to international human rights
claims after World War II," sovereignty is now being challenged by
claims of international labor rights in the field of employment standards
and industrial relations.
This Article seeks to illuminate this challenge to sovereignty in two
case studies of labor rights advocacy. Part I sets the stage with an
overview of the growing importance of labor rights and labor standards
as the world economy shifts from a nation-based economy to a single,
global economy. Part II examines the case studies: the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Guatemala. NAFTA is a case
study of advocacy to establish fair international labor standards. The

Schlossberg, United States Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP.
LAB. LJ. 48-49, 57-58 (1989) (providing a brief history and description of the ILO
and discussing the role of the United States in the ILO's development); see also
DAVID A. MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE LLO. AND ITS ROLE IN THE
VORLD COsfMuNrrY (1969) (providing a historical overview of the 11.O). The United
States has ratified eleven of 174 ILO Conventions, seven of them relating to conditions in the rharitime industry. Of the rest, one ratification concerned approval of ILO
constitutional changes. The other three are of wider significance: Convention No. 144
on Tripartite Consultations, committing to government-business-labor consultation on
labor affairs (ratified 1988); No. 160 on Labor Statistics, standardizing statistical reporting requirements and measurement methods (ratified 1990); and, most significantly,
No. 105 on forced labor (ratified 1991). United States multinational corporations acceded to ratification of Convention No. 105, given the universality of strictures
against forced labor, but strongly resisted United States ratification of 1LO Conventions favorable to trade unions.
10. See International Union Report Places U.S. Among Violators of Basic Labor
Rights, 7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA), at 441 (May 5, 1993) (reporting that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions cited the United States as one of 87 countries
violating fundamental trade union rights as recognized by the Conventions of the
International Labour Organisation in its "Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union
Rights"); International Unions Accuse Food Lion of Unfair Practices in United States,
7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA), at 577-78 (June 16, 1993) (reporting that Food Lion, a
United States subsidiary of a Belgian retailer, is guilty of unfair labor practices and
refuses to deal with trade unions).
11. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Lm', in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL Hu'MAN RIGHTs PRACTICE 4-5 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992) (describing the emergence of universal human rights after World War II).
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Guatemala case study exemplifies advocacy by U.S. labor rights support-

ers on behalf of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, where recourse
is sought through worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws and
through a litigation strategy that views U.S. courts as a forum for asserting international labor rights claims.
I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF WORKERS' RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
As the world moves toward a global economy, differences in labor
standards, worker organization, and labor relations policies among countries at varying levels of development become critical variables in trade
and investment decision making. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor
rights cases that are the focus of this Article do not arise in a vacuum:
these cases arise in a context of increasing importance of labor rights on
the international agenda. 2
A. ORGANIZED LABOR, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT PATrERNS

In many countries, organized labor movements play an important role
in influencing trade and development strategies.

For example, workers

and unions often mount sharp resistance to austerity and privatization
policies imposed on their governments by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other global lending agencies. 3

12. The United States has recognized the importance of labor rights by linking them
to preferential treatment for developing countries in trade programs. Labor rights provisions in U.S. trade laws specify five "internationally recognized worker rights" whose
observance conditions a country's beneficiary trade status with the United States:
(A) the right of association;
(B)
the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work,
work, and occupational safety and health.
19 U.S.C. § 2462(4) (1988).
13. See, e.g., James Brooke, Brazil Ignores Protests and Begins to Privatize, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1991, at D2 (reporting on outbreaks of violence in protest of Brazil's
privatization plan); Shelley Emling, Latin Labor Strife Expected to Intensify, J. COM.,
Dec. 30, 1991, at Al (reporting that Central American governments will "lock horns"
with labor organizations over plans to sell inefficient state enterprises to pay back
foreign debts to international lenders); Job Protests in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1991, at D5 (stating that thousands of employees of state-owned banks had gone
on strike to protest privatization plans which they feared threatened their jobs).
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Traditional union tactics of organizing, bargaining, and striking also
have important effects on trade and investment. Korean workers, after

decades of suppression by military governments, countered the suppression with a broad movement of strikes in the 1980s and organizing
campaigns that transformed Korea's export base." This movement

forced sharp salary increases and challenged management's autocratic
control of the workplace.15 Companies retaliated by moving operations
to Thailand, Malaysia, Central America, and other lower-cost export
processing areas.' 6 As turmoil continued to jeopardize the stability de-

sired by international investors, the Korean government responded by
launching new crackdowns on organized labor. 7 Like Korea, the Malaysian Government intervened by prohibiting independent, freely-chosen
unions in the growing semiconductor industry. This measure created
investment problems in Malaysia and placed the government in a pre-

carious situation. If Malaysia continued to prohibit the formation of
national unions, the United States considered imposing trade sanctions

for labor rights violations. If Malaysia lifted the ban on genuine unions,
United States-based multinational companies threatened to leave.' Political reform and union tactics presented governments with difficult ques-

tions on how to address labor rights in the context of international trade.

14. See generally

GEORGE E. OGLE, SOUTH KOREA: DISSENT WITHIN THE Eco115-53 (discussing the Korean labor movement from 1987 to 1989).
15. See Steven R. Weisman, Korea's Boom Slows Just a Bit; Labor Unrest Jolts
A Surging Economy, N.Y. TlmES, June 10, 1989, at 35-36 (describing strikes and
salary demands, and their impact on the Korean economy).
16. See Peter Maass, Foreign Firms a Target in South Korea, WASH. POST, May
21, 1989, at H3 (describing plant shutdowns and relocations by U.S. firms in Korea).
17. See IMF Welcomes ILO Adjudication Calling for Worker Rights in Korea,
INT'L METALwoRKxas FED. No. 4, Mar. 22, 1993 (press release) (describing ILO
findings of continuing worker rights violations in Korea).
18. See leyamalar Kandiah, National Union's Out; Electronic Workers Can Form
Only In-House Unions: Kim Sai, STAR (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 20, 1988 (stating that
the Malaysian Government announced that electronic workers could form in-house
unions but not a national union); see also International Labor Rights Education and
Research Fund, Petition Before the United States Trade Representative for Malaysia's
Violations of the Worker Rights Provision of the Generalized System of Preferences,
June 1, 1990 (requesting that Malaysia's status as a beneficiary of the Generalized
System of Preferences be terminated because Malaysia's non-compliance with worker
rights standards).
NOmIC MIRACLE
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WORKER EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

1. Child and Forced Labor

A tactic that may affect investment and directly provide a country
with a competitive advantage in international trade is the exploitation of
workers. For example, the ILO 9 determined that the exploitative use of
child labor was a growing factor in world trade, 0 and several media
reports in recent years have substantiated these accusations. 2 The use
of children younger than age thirteen to produce clothing, hand-woven
carpets, and other products in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other
Asian countries has provoked legislation in Congress to outlaw the importation of goods produced in this manner into the United States.'
The United States also has disapproved of countries that employ prison or forced labor. The use of prison labor in China to manufacture
goods for the United States market has led to congressional challenges
to China's most favored nation (MFN) trade statusY Similarly, charges
of forced labor of Haitian sugar cane cutters in the Dominican Republic
has prompted the United States to threaten export sanctions.24 Finally,

19. See supra note 9 (discussing the functions and effectiveness of the ILO).
20. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, WORLD LABOR REPORT

13

(1992) (noting that hundreds of millions of children are at work throughout the
world). As many as eleven percent of the children in various Asian countries, twenty
percent of the children in certain African countries, and up to twenty-six percent of
the children in some Latin American countries are members of the workforce. Id.
21. See, e.g., Edward A. Gargan, Bound to Looms by Poverty and Fear, Boys in
India Make a Few Men Rich, N.Y. TRMES, July 9, 1992, at A8 (illustrating the harsh
conditions under which children are forced to work in India); Gina Kolata, More
Children Are Employed, Often Perilously, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, §1 at 1 (exposing the use of child labor in the United States).
22. See S. REP. No. 613, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1993) (prohibiting the
entry into the United States market of products from industries suspected of using
child labor).
23. See Daniel Southerland, China Said to Still Use Forced Labor: Report Con.
tends Exports Violate Pact, Threaten Favored Trade Status, WASH. POST, May 19,
1993, at F3 (reporting that the Clinton Administration was contemplating the revocation of China's most favored nation status in part because of China's continued
illegal exportation to the United States of goods produced by forced labor).
24. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A CHILDHOOD ABDUCTED:
CHILDREN CUTTING SUGAR CANE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 77-80 (1991) (explaining that the United States Trade Representative nearly revoked the Dominican
Republic's trade preference status under the General System of Preferences and the
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millions of workers around the world are offered advance payments of

salary and then held in debt bondage by their employersY
2. Discrimination and Additional Worker Abuses in Developing
Countries

Claims of discrimination in the workplace also have contributed to the
recognition of labor rights as an international dilemma. Apartheid in

South Africa, for example, has been a target of trade sanctions for many
years. Workplace discrimination against Black South Africans prompted
anti-apartheid advocates in the United States to promulgate the Sullivan
Principles, which stated that U.S. corporations voluntarily should enforce

non-discrimination practices in their operations in South Africa. In
1986, Congress passed more expansive, mandatory sanctions
The massive transfer of operations from developed to developing
countries in the garment, manufacturing, and electronic assembly industries' has led to widespread claims of sex discrimination against wom-

en workers, who make up the majority of the workforce in these factories.' Seen as submissive to male authority, women workers are

Caribbean Basin Initiative, because it was alleged that the country was not adhering
to basic international standards of worker rights); NATIONAL COALITIO, FOR HAMiAN
REFUGEES, AMERICAS WATCH, A TROUBLED YEAR: HAITIANs IN THE DOmiNICAN
REPUBuC 5 (1992) (attacking the failure of the United States to use its influence as
the Dominican Republic's largest trading partner to protect the basic human rights
owed to the Haitian workers).
25. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, WORLD LABOR REPORT 11
(1993) (explaining that, due to low wages and practices that require payments from
laborers for tools and fine workers for unsatisfactory work, laborers are never able to
repay their debts); see also Molly Moore, Casting Off the Caste System; Indian
Movement Teaching Bonded Laborers to Rebel, WASH. POsT, Nov. 17. 1992. at Al
(providing specific examples of debt bondage in India).
26. See Daniel Pink, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good for America Good
for General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 180, 182-85 (1990) (outlining the
Sullivan Principles and discussing their success in achieving certain improvements in
working conditions).
27. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(d), 5001-5116 (1988).
28. See JOSEPH GRUNWALD & KENNETh FLAMM, THE GLOBAL FACTORY: FOREIGN ASSEMBLY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 217-37 (1985) (differentiating the means of
production in the semiconductor industry in the developing world from that in the
industrial world).
29. See Kathryn B. Ward, Women in the Global Economy, in 3 \VOIEN AND
WORK: AN ANNUAL REVIEW 28-32 (Barbara A. Gutek, Ann H. Stromberg & Laurie
Larwood eds., 1988) (discussing economic subjugation of women in the global assem-
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thought to be hostile to labor unions and are vulnerable to sexual exploitation by supervisors.'
In addition to discrimination in the workplace, payment of minimum
wages, excessive working hours and poor occupational health and safety
standards also can affect trade and investment patterns. During the fall
of 1992, United States television shows 60 Minutes and Nightline broadcast dramatic revelations of United States government assistance to Central American countries luring businesses from the United States.' In
one telling sequence, a hidden camera and microphone at a trade show
sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development

(AID) recorded representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala
underbidding each other with minimum wage quotes, beginning at ninety
cents and falling to fifty-seven cents per hour.32 The controversy became a potent issue in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign33 and
provoked immediate congressional action ordering AID to halt such
assistance.'

bly line).
30. See M. PATRICIA

FERNANDEZ KELLY, FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND MY PEOPLE: WOMEN AND INDUsTRY IN MExIco's FRONTIER (1983) (documenting the plight

of female workers in the garment industry in Mexico); RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL
FACrORY: ANALYsIS AND ACTION FOR A NEW ECONOMIC ERA 11-12 (1990) (discussing and criticizing assertions of a "natural docility" of women workers in Third World
factories).
31.

Nightline: Paying to Lose Our Jobs (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 29-30,

1992 [hereinafter Nightline] (reporting that money from the United States Agency for
International Development is given to foreign governments to finance their promotion
of a better business climate for United States manufacturers in Latin America and the
Caribbean Basin); 60 Minutes: Hiring Rosa Martinez (CBS television broadcast, Sept.
27, 1992) (documenting that the United States Government is promoting the export of
textile factories to Central America and the Caribbean Basin by providing companies

with low-interest loans, as well as by advertising the availability of inexpensive labor
in foreign countries).
32. Nightline, supra note 31.
33. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SETrINO THE STANDARD: INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 5 (Mar.

1993) (outlining President Clinton's campaign promises with respect to achieving
uniform workplace standards and proposing various initiatives that should be pursued
in order to achieve better standards for workers throughout the world).
34. See The 1992 Campaign: In Dispute; Quayle and Gore Battle Devolves Into
a Hand-to-Hand Fight About 4 Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1992, at A19 (describing
the congressional response to the AID program in Central America); David Judson,
Don't Scrap Foreign Aid, Redesign It, Lawmaker Says, GANNETr NEws SERVICE, Oct.

2, 1992 (discussing legislation to reverse the "job exports" strategy in aid to Central
America).
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Excessive working hours, like minimum wages, characterize life on

the "global assembly line" in the developing world. Twelve- to fourteenhour days, double shifts, overnight work to meet rush orders, and other
extended workdays are not uncommon.' Hazardous job safety and

health conditions are also common. In Korea, the economic "miracle"
was financed, at least in part, by ignoring worker safety.' As noted
above, violent rank and file reaction to such policies in the late 1980s
deeply affected trade and investment patterns throughout Asia.'
3. Labor Rights in Developed Nations

Discrimination and abuses in the workplace do not occur solely in
developing nations. They also occur in and have major trade implications for industrialized nations. In Europe, many employers have objected to "burdensome" employee protections in European labor law, such
as layoff restrictions and severance pay requirements.' In turn, major
European car manufacturers such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz are be-

ginning to erect plants in the United States, citing lower wages and
weaker unions than the powerful German Metalworkers Federation."

35. See Denis MacShane, Dreaming of the Forty-Hour Week, 1989 NATION 658
(illustrating the excessive working hours faced by laborers in parts of Asia).
36. See Peter Maass, S. Korea's Economic Miracle Taking Toll Among Workers;
Job Safety Continues to Be Low Priority, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 1989, at El (documenting the current mistreatment of laborers in South Korea).
37. See OGLE. supra note 14, at 1-26 (explaining that the poor working conditions in South Korea evolved from a legacy of military rule throughout the early and
middle 1900s, and left the Korean worker with a long, uphill struggle for better wages and conditions once their labor movement was established).
38. See Patrick Oster, EC's Labor Proposals Are Causing Concern; Changes
Would Raise Costs for U.S. Firms, WASH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1991, at C4 (reporting that
European business owners are wary that, if enacted, the new workplace rules proposed
by the European Community (EC) Council will result in higher operating costs); see
also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities:
What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers, 11
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564, 594-613 (1991) (outlining the twelve worker rights proposed by the EC Council in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights);
Roger Cohen, European Fears of Unemployment Will Only Rise; Companies Shift
Jobs to Escape High Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 1993, at Al (hypothesizing that the
recent increase in unemployment in Europe is due in large part to the changes in
workplace rules, not as a result of the overall economic depression).
39. See Doron P. Levin, What BMIV Sees in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1993, at 5 (announcing BMW's decision to open a car assembly plant in South
Carolina); see also Warren Brown, Mercedes to Build U.S. Assembly Plant, WAH.
PosT, Apr. 6, 1993, at D3 (reporting that Mercedes will open a plant in the United
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Additional labor problems exist in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty,

which set forth an economic integration plan for Europe, has been jeopardized by Great Britain's refusal to accept the "Social Chapter" on

labor rights and labor standards. ' Upsetting its continental partners, the
UK is luring enterprises by promising low labor costs and tamed
unions.4' The controversy promises to continue as the opposition Labor
Party pledges to adopt the Social Chapter if empowered. Even Mickey
Mouse cannot evade labor rights issues in trade: the new EuroDisney
park near Paris ran into protests when Disney - a leader in the United
States trade surplus in international services and entertainment - imposed its personal appearance code on employees who claimed that their
fundamental rights were violated.42
In addition to Europe, worker rights in the United States also are
sharply debated in connection with trade and investment plans. Thousands of employees are illegally fired each year for union activity.43 In
the United States, the right to strike, treated by most analysts as an
integral feature of the right of association," has been weakened by the
use of permanent replacements to break strikes." One case in particular,

States for the production of utility vehicles).
40. See Richard W. Stevenson, Major Is Rebuffed in Parliament in Vote on the
European Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at Al (explaining the political division
within the British Parliament in which Prime Minister Major opposed the passage of
the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty while the opposition Labor Party supported it).
41. See William Drozdiak, French Say United Europe Promoted 'Job Poaching':
Shift of Plant to Scotland Sets Off Furor, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1993, at A23 (reporting that Scottish workers agreed to waive their right to strike and accepted a
year-long wage freeze, which has attracted several businesses to the area from other
European locations).
42. See Disney Dress Code Chafes in the Land of Haute Couture, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1991, at 1 (noting the problems that EuroDisney has encountered by enacting detailed rules regarding how its employees may dress and the type of appearance
such employees must uphold). Not only are the employees complaining that the rules
violate their rights, but also scholars and critics are claiming that Disney is violating
the privacy of its French employees by attempting to impose American culture on the
French. Id.
43. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (discussing the high level of
discriminatory discharges for union activity by U.S. employers).
44. See RUTH BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF
THE FREEDOM TO STRIKE 71-92 (1990) (arguing that labor organizations and the right
to strike are basic human rights that should be recognized by all nations).
45. The permanent replacement doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in
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when the Caterpillar Corporation broke a United Auto Workers strike in

1992 by threatening to bring in permanent replacements,

has important

implications for a key export industry. The resulting bitterness,'

in

contrast to what had been an extensive program of labor-management
cooperation, now jeopardizes Caterpillar's place as a premier exporter of

heavy construction equipment in its competition with Japanese manufacturers.
Charges of sex, race, and national origin discrimination also mark

labor relations in developed countries. The place of immigrant laborers
from Southern Europe and Northern Africa has been sharply debated in
France, Germany and other Northern European countries. The opening of

borders in Eastern Europe has brought large-scale migration of workers
seeking better-paying jobs in the West, and finding painful discrimina-

tion as well.48 Discrimination against Hispanic workers in the United
States, both undocumented migrants and United States citizens, continues
to undermine worker rights in this country."'

As the globalization of economic activity proceeds apace and capital
goods and services become increasingly mobile, workers and unions are

pushing for expanded rights and protections on an international scale!'
In many cases, employers and governments are responding with demands for austerity and concessions?' The ensuing conflicts complicate
NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
46. See Kevin Kelly et al., Caterpillar's Don Fites: Why He Didn't Blink, Bus.
WK., Aug. 10, 1992, at 56-57 (citing the UAW's animosity and its belief that it is
engaged in a "long war").
47. Id.
48. See John Darnton, Western Europe Is Ending Its Welcome to Immigrants, N.Y.
TiMEs Aug. 10, 1993, at Al, A6 (describing restrictions and discrimination against immigrants seeking refuge in Western Europe).
49. See L.A. COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR, AFL-CIO, THE IMPACT OF THE
IMMI1GRATION REFORM AND CONTROL AcT ON ORGANIZED LABOR IN Los ANGELES
18-19 (1992) [hereinafter L.A. LABOR] (discussing the extent of discrimination against
immigrant workers and the 'effects of discrimination on the ability of unions to organize and bargain for such workers); IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEmNT MO,,rrORING
PROJECr,

AMRICAN FRIENDS SERVICE CoMMrEE, SEALING OUR BORDERS:

THE

HUMAN TOLL 14-15 (1992) [hereinafter THE HUtMAN TOLL] (stating that discrimination

by employees against Hispanics and Asian immigrants divides and weakens unions).
50. See Don J. Pease, New Thinking in East-West Trade, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, April 20, 1989, at 18 (noting that recognition of economic rights of workers
may be a harbinger of future international policy making).
51. See Ben Parfitt Vansun, Mill Closures Will Idle More Than 500 Staff, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 4, 1991, at DI (stating that as a result of higher costs, a Canadi-
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trade policy and development strategies, and challenge traditional patterns of sovereignty in establishing labor rights and labor standards
within national borders.
Having established a framework focusing on the growing importance
of labor rights in international trade, this Article now addresses two concrete cases of international labor rights advocacy. The cases show a
variety of ways in which the issues arise and are dealt with by unions,
employers, governments, and NGOs.
If. CASE STUDIES

This Article examines two current case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of private actors challenging traditional notions of sovereignty
with respect to worker rights in the transnational economy. The first
study looks at the role of trade unions and allied human rights organizations in the struggle over NAFTA. The second examines labor rights
advocacy in the United States on behalf of workers and unions in Guatemala. Although the elements, strategies, and tactics of the non-governmental actors differ, they still share the same effect of raising labor
rights and labor standards from a purely domestic to an international
level.
A. PRIVATE ACTORS AND NAFTA
1. Contributions and Actions of Private Actors
The U.S. House of Representatives approved the North American Free
Trade Agreement on November 17, 1993.52 The Senate gave its approval on November 20, 1993." The congressional voting culminated an
arduous legislative battle marked by splits among Democratic Party
leaders,' and Republican and Democratic Party activists.5 In addition,

an company is seeking concessions in areas of seniority and scheduling).
52. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves U.S.-Canada-Mexico Trade Pact on 234
to 200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory; NAFTA Split Parties,Shuffled Politics As Administration Overtook Opponents, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al (recounting Clinton's
victory in winning House approval of NAFTA).
53. See Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final CongressionalTest, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21,
1993, at Al (reporting Senate approval of NAFTA by a 61 to 38 vote).
54. See Robin Toner, CongressionalLeaders: Divided Sentiments, Divided Loyalties,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1993, at BIO (describing politicking in Congress prior to the
NAFTA vote).
55.
See Dan Balz, NAFTA Forces Each Party to Face Internal Divisions, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 17, 1993, at A8 (explaining differences of opinion on NAFTA within political
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unusual pro- and anti-NAFTA coalitions formed,' which resulted in
Clinton Administration "trading" for pro-NAFTA votes." The NAFTA
vote also exposed conflict between the Democratic Administration and
two of its chief constituencies, the organized labor movement and an
important faction of the environmental movement."
International labor rights and other social standards became pivotal
issues in the debate over NAFTA. ° These issues became critical in part
due to the breadth of the coalitions formed in the United States, Canada,
and Mexico to oppose NAFTA, "' and in part due to the barbed treatment of the agreement by Ross Perot, who evoked "the great sucking
sound" of jobs going South in televised presidential debates and in a

parties).
56. See David E. Rosenbaum, Splintered on Trade: 2 Unusual PoliticalAlliances
Reflect Long-Term Gain and Short-Term Fear,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15. 1993, at B12 (noting
"scrambled politics" surrounding the NAFTA debate in the United States).
57. See Michael Wines, A 'Bazaar'Method of Dealingfor Votes, N.Y. Ims, Nov.
11, 1993, at A23 (discussing "retail politics" involved in assuring NAFTA votes); Kevin
Merida & Tom Kenworthy, ForSome, a Bitter NAFTA Taste: House Awaits Falloutfrom
BipartisanVote Deal-Making, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al (describing "logrolling"
and "deals President Clinton cut" assuring special treatment for sugar, citrus, vegetable,
beef, peanuts, appliances and other products to secure lawmakers' votes for NAFTA).
58. See Peter T. Kilbom, Unions Girdfor lVar Over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, OCL 4.
1993, at A14 (reporting that unions sought to turn NAFTA into a single issue debate over
labor rights); Thomas K. Friedman, Adamant Unions Zero In on Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1993, at B10 (discussing union leaders' grave concerns with NAFTA).
59. See Keith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Supportfor Free-Trade
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at Al (discussing rift within environmental community
over NAFTA).
60. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Vague Mexico Wage Pledge Clouds Free Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at Al (focusing on minimum wage concerns of
NAFrA); Anthony DePalma, Painful Lessons for Mexican Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1993, at 39 (discussing Volkswagen's lockout as a precursor to Mexican labor problems
after NAFTA); Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds Over Trade
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al (reporting efforts in Mexico City to address
Mexican environmental concerns).
61. See generally INsTrI'trIE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND AuIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE
TRADE, NAFTA RESOURCES (1993) (providing a substantial list of anti-NAFTA coalition
participants and resources). The principal United States coalition with respect to labor.
trade, and development concerns is the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), coordinated
in Washington, D.C. by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund
(ILRERF). The Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), also based in Washington, D.C., focuses
on environmental and consumer affairs in connection with NAFTA. Canada's major coalition is the Action Canada Network, based in Ottawa; Mexico's major coalition is the National Action Network on Free Trade, based in Mexico City.
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later debate with Vice President Al Gore.62 The alleged lack of adequate labor protections became a focal point of opposition to NAFTA, 3
along with news of Mexican efforts to lure deliberately businesses from

the United States,' 4 by revelations that claims of net gains in United
States employment under NAFTA are exaggerated,' by continuing evidence that Mexico's political and judicial systems are rife with corruption,' and by reports that United States companies operating in Mexico
are among the worst violators of labor rights.'
United States NGOs have long been active on issues of labor rights
and working conditions, particularly in the maquiladora factory zones
along the United States-Mexico border. United States-based companies
own hundreds of maquiladora plants and employ approximately half a

million Mexican workers." Concerns about pollution, unsafe working

62. The '92 Vote: The 2nd PresidentialDebate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 15,
1992); The '92 Vote: The 3rd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19,
1992); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993).
63. See Lane Kirkland, A Backward-Looking Deal: The PactIs Full of Safeguardsfor
Property Rights, but None for Workers' Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A25
(criticizing NAFTA for failing to account for critical labor issues in the United States and
Mexico).
64. See Tim Golden, Who's Stealing Jobs From Whom? Mexico Is Finding Free
Trade Has Political Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at E5 (finding that entrepreneurs had established an investment fund to buy American companies and move
them to Mexico).
65. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1993, at DI (analyzing reports that claims of job gains for the United States under
NAFTA do not hold up beyond 1995, and concluding that in the long term the United States will lose jobs).
66. See Enrique Rice et al., 'Trick or Trade?'; For Most Mexicans, This Treaty
Only Props Up One-Party Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1993, at C3 (arguing that
reform in Mexico's civil liberties, political process, and labor rights are needed before
approving the free trade agreement); Tim Golden, Mexican Leader Asks Executives To
Give Party $25 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al (stating that the
contributions may have been improper and that such contributions are unregulated in
Mexico); Tod Robberson, In Mexico, System Turns Cops Into Robbers, WASH. POST,
Mar. 12, 1993, at Al (reporting that bribery and theft is a way of life for Mexico
City police officers due to the corruption of their "bosses").
67. See Anthony DePalma, Report on Trade Treaty Is Critical of Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1993, at D2 (discussing reports that "major American companies that are
staunch supporters of the North American Free Trade Agreement [have] ... consistently
violated workers' rights").
68. See Larry Weiss, The Wealthy, Not Workers, Stand to Gain from Trade Pact,
STAR TRIB., May 16, 1992, at 17A (noting that of the half-million Mexican workers
employed by U.S. companies, seventy percent are women).
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conditions, and poverty-level wages have motivated the AFL-CIO and a
coalition of religious and environmental groups to issue a code of conduct for United States companies in the maquiladora region.'
The MAQUILADORA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (Code) seeks to pro-

mote a safe environment, safe workplaces, and an adequate standard of
living for workers0 The Code addresses hazardous waste disposal,
chemical leaks, and transportation of toxic materials. The Code further
requires disclosure to workers and communities on the use and risks of
chemicals and other hazardous materials; suggests mandatory workplace
safety and health committees with training for worker members; seeks to
protect the right to organize and ban discrimination, including sexual harassment; and calls for fair wages, hours, and working conditions.7' The
Code also would abolish barracks-style living quarters for workers, and
establish a trust fund to improve housing, health care, sanitary services,
and other infrastructure.'
In addition to NGOs, some organizations, such as the United Electrical Workers (UE), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union
(ILGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU),
and other trade unions active in organizing among Mexican-American
workers in Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas have
created joint movements with independent Mexican unionists to support
organizing in the maquiladora factories' Women's organizations and
environmental groups have forged similar movements!'
Researchers in the legal field contributed analyses of labor laws and
how they would affect the new trade agreement, 5 including a detailed

69. THE CORPORArE EXAhMNR INTERFArrH CENTER ON CORPORATE REsPONSiBRTY, MAQUIADORA STANDARDS OF CoNDucT (1991).

70. Id.
71. Iat at 3-5.
72. 1I at 5.
73. See, e.g., UNrrED ELECRICAL WORKERS. RADIO AND MACHINE VORKERs OF
AMERICA AND FRENTE AUTENTICO DEL TRABAJO STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL ALL!ANCE, STATEMENT OF JOINT WORK (1991) (stating their intention to collaborate in
organizing unions in maquiladora zone electronics plants).
74. See EQUAL MEANS, WHY Is FREE TRADE A WO.MEN'S Issu? (1991) (noting
the strides made by women in this movement); NATIONAL ToxIC CAMPAIGN FUND,
BORDER TROUBLE: RIVERS IN PERIL (1991) (illustrating the environmental groups
positions and actions); see generally TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STuDIES, NAFTA
AND THE UNITED STATESIMEXICO BORDER ENVIRONENT:. OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1992) (listing the organizations involved in creating the NAFTA document).
75. See, e.g., Ann M. Bartow, Comment, The Rights of Workers in Mexico 11
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76 Private sector activism
study of women workers in the maquiladora.

on NAFTA culminated in a comprehensive Citizens' Analysis of
NAFTA, released in December 1992.' At the same time, the Mexican
Action Network published "Our Evaluation on the Formal Negotiations
of the Free Trade Agreement," and the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives issued its "Which Way for the Americas: Analysis of NAFTA
Proposals and the Impact on Canada.""8

COMP. LAB. L.J. 182 (1990) (describing Mexico's Labor Code); Amy H. Goldin,
Comment, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of Democracy in

Trade Unions, 11 COmp. LAB. L.J. 203 (1990) (criticizing elements of Mexican labor
law and practice); Susanna Peters, Comment, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras:
Choosing Between Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 226
(1990) (analyzing labor abuses in the maquiladora zone); Michael S. Barr et al.,
Comment, Labor and Environmental Rights in the Proposed Mexico-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 14 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) (analyzing Mexican labor law,
comparing labor clauses in the European Community Social Charter, and proposing a
dispute-settlement mechanism for labor issues).
76. See Frances Lee Ansley, U.S. Mexico Trade from the Bottom: A Postcard
from the Border, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (1992) (describing the reaction of
American women factory workers, who had lost their jobs when their factories relocated to the maquiladora region, at their meeting with the Mexican women who
worked in the new Mexican factory zone). A University of Tennessee professor organized a delegation of women who lost their jobs to the maquiladora region to tour
the Mexican factory zone and meet with the women workers there. Id. In addition to
the written report, the nationwide public television program NOVA aired footage showing, working conditions in the maquiladora and their effect on United States and
Mexican women workers. Frances Lee Ansley, North American Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate, 22 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 329, 332 n.8 (1993) (noting
filming of visits with women workers in the border region, aired by Public Broadcasting System on May 26 and 27, 1992).
77. See JOHN AUDLEY Er AL., U.S. CrrIZENs' ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT[page] (1992) [hereinafter CrMzENS' ANALYSIs] (addressing labor rights, working conditions, employment and income, environment, agriculture,
energy, economic development, consumer affairs, health and safety, dispute resolution
and enforcement, human rights and democracy, and other NAFTA-related issues).
Representatives of the following organizations coordinated the NAFTA analysis: the
Sierra Club, United Auto Workers, Fair Trade Campaign, Institute for Policy Studies,
National Lawyers Guild, Greenpeace USA, The Development Group for Alternative
Policies, International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, Economic Policy
Institute, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and Public Citizen, and contained
contributing materials from dozens of other citizens groups. Id.
78. See supra note 61 (describing NAFTA-related coalitions).
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2. The Labor Agreement
During his successful campaign for the presidency, then-Governor Bill
Clinton insisted that final approval of the NAFTA depended on further
negotiation -of a parallel agreement with Canada and Mexico on labor
rights and labor standards. Labor advocates opposed the side agreement that emerged, especially for its failure to include rights of association, organizing, and bargaining in the scope of independent review and
enforcement mechanisms in the side agreement.'
The NAFTA labor side agreement simultaneously preserves and
breaches traditional sovereignty in labor matters. The side agreement
affirms "the right of each Party [the United States, Canada, and Mexico]
to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor laws and regulations."'"
At the same time, the labor side agreement subjects eight areas of
labor standards to the tripartite oversight system set up in the agreement.' In addition, three of the eight areas come under the dispute
settlement and enforcement provision of the side agreement that could
result in fines of up to $20 million' or a suspension of NAFTA trade
benefits ' against a country that has a "persistent pattern of failure...
to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor or
minimum wage technical labor standards."'

79. See Gwen Ifil, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; With Reser'ation,
Clinton Endorses Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TMIES, Oct. 5 1992, at Al (discussing thenGovernor Clinton's stance on NAFTA's labor issues).

80. See JEROmE L LEvINSON, ECONOMIC PouCY INsTrITrE, THE LABOR SIDE
ACCORD TO THE NORTH ATMRICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENr. AN ENDORSEMENT OF
THE ABUSE OF WORKER RIGHTS IN Mxi.co (1993) (stating the numerous possible
flaws in the trade agreement and its negative effect on labor rights).

81. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Betveen the Government
of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, art. 2 [hereinafter Labor Side Agreement] (finalizing labor issues among the NAFTA parties).
82. The eight areas are: 1) forced labor, 2) child labor, 3) minimum wage and over-

time pay; 4) employment discrimination; 5) equal pay for men and women; 6) occupational
safety and health; 7) workers' compensation; and 8) protection of migrant workers. See id.
art. 41 (defining "technical labor standards"). Section B, art. 23 of the Labor Side Agree-

ment subjects "technical labor standards" to reporting by an Evaluation Committee of
Experts. lId section B, art. 23.

83. Id. art. 39(4)(b) and Annex 39.
84. Id. art. 41.
85. ld art. 29(1).
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The NAFTA labor side agreement fails to establish international standards that can be enforced under the agreement; to that extent, sovereignty in setting domestic labor standards is maintained. The agreement
does permit, however, international oversight, and a measure of enforcement, over each country's administration of its own labor laws. This
"half a loaf' disappoints advocates of binding international labor standards,' but sets the stage for continuing efforts to establish labor standards in international trade both in future changes in NAFTA, and in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeY
Future debates over NAFTA will continue to address such questions.
Should countries limit themselves to a uniform set of minimum labor
standards to be enforced separately by each government, or to a supranational enforcement regime like that envisioned for the trade rules
under NAFTA?88 Will a lowest-common-denominator of the three
country's labor laws serve as the basis for continental standards, or will
the labor rights clauses of United Nations human rights instruments and
human rights conventions of the 1LO serve as the starting point, as
recommended by labor rights advocates? 9 How will the disparity in
levels of development between two advanced industrial powers and a
Third World country be reconciled in matters of child labor or minimum
wage requirements?' What standing will private parties - individual
workers, trade unions, human rights organizations, and other private
advocates - have to invoke labor rights protection under a NAFTA
labor rights agreement?9' Will state and provincial laws be preempted

86. See LEVINSON, supra note 80.
87. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD
ECONOMY 335-56 (1992) (discussing efforts to include labor and environmental standards
in the GATI).
88. See Barr, supra note 75, at 47-49 (analyzing the structure of the European
Community institutions as a possible model for enforcing policy options of NAFTA);
see also CITIZENS' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 46-50 (discussing NAFrA dispute
resolution provisions that alarm labor and environmental groups).
89. See CrrrzENs' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 27-28 (showing how United Nations standards have obtained sufficient consensus to be adopted as standards to be
included in NAFTA); Lance Compa, InternationalLabor Standards and Instruments of
Recourse for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151 (1992) (noting that the specialized United Nations body called the International Labour Organisation is the primary forum for presenting international labor rights claims).
90. See Rothstein, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing the issue of standardized wages
internationally).
91. See Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the InternationalEconomy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REv. 31 (1981) (noting the lack of
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or permitted to stand undisturbed in the federal system of each country?9

Whatever the answers to these and other issues involving labor rights
and labor standards in North America, they pose direct challenges to

traditional principles of sovereignty in domestic economic and development policies 3 Taken as a whole, action by private labor rights advocates has opened up opportunities for new roles and new influence by

workers
and trade unions in the transnational economy of North Ameri4
9

ca.

B. UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALAN LABOR RIGHTS ADVOCACY

Over the past four decades, suppression of organized labor has been a
consistent feature of both open military rule and military-controlled
civilian governments in Guatemala.9" In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
however, United States labor rights advocates targeted Guatemala's record through a systematic movement to expose worker rights violations
and created new models for labor rights advocacy.' As with labor
rights issues in NAFTA, these efforts initially seemed fruitless, if not
regulatory protections for workers in developing countries).
92. See CrrIzENs' ANALYSIS, supra note 77, at 51 (discussing how federal preemption of state law becomes problematic in the application of international
agreement); see generally John Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems:
A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) (concluding that national legal
systems must take international institutions and treaty-making processes into account in
order to preserve the validity of legal domestic application in addition to incorporating
international legal norms).
93. See Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade
Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L REV. 79 (1990) (discussing the goal of human rights advocates to create viable international mechanisms for
the protection of labor rights).
94. See id. at 80 (noting that both governmental and NGOs are seeking to advance human rights via policy decisions); but see id. at 109 (discussing how a private
party may be ineffective in gathering information due to possible inaccessibility to a
particular country).

95. See

JAMS A. GOLDSTON, SHATrERED HOPE: GUATEMALAN WORKERS AND

PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 5-9 (1989) (discussing the history of the repression of
labor unions in Guatemala).
96. See International Commission for Central American Development and Recovery, POVERTY, CONFLICr AND HOPE: A TuRNiNG POINT IN CENTRAL AMECA. Feb.
15, 1989 (press conference) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Omni File (discussing
how Commission members met with government officials and were able to create
town meetings in certain countries, bringing together representatives of the government, private sector, labor, and church).
THE
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futile. Their innovative use of different forums in the United States for
raising international labor rights claims on behalf of Guatemalans exploited the fissures in traditional doctrines of absolute sovereignty in

labor relations matters, fissures that appeared under the pressure of global economic integration.'
1. Background
A decade of blossoming for Guatemalan trade unions and popular
organizations in the decade following the Second World War ended with
a military takeover in 1954 sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) that eliminated the elected government.9" Prior to the

coup, one-fourth of the Guatemalan workforce belonged to the unions."
The majority of these workers were in stable, regular employment set-

tings with minimum wage and social insurance legislation designed to
protect employees."° For the past four decades, however, the military
rule and military-controlled civilian governments in Guatemala have
consistently suppressed organized labor." Enforcement of protective
legislation languished as the wealthy land- and business-owning class,
backed by the military, reasserted control over the country, its resources,
and its workers."~

97. See AFL-CIO Report on Worker Rights Violations Abroad Submitted to Office
of U.S. Trade Representative, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (July 2, 1987), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing how the AFL-CIO alerted the United
States Trade Representative of the failure of Guatemala to abide by internationally
recognized standards of worker rights based on the Generalized System of Preferences); Excerpts From Speech of Administration Policy Toward Latin America, NOTISURLATIN AM. POL. AFF., May 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File
(reiterating the Clinton Administration's promotion and protection of human rights
goals within the framework of a labor rights agenda).
98. See STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, BITrER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 28 (1982) (detailing Guatemala's history after the
1954 United States-backed coup); JAMES HANDY, GIFr OF THE DEVIL: HISTORY OF
GUATEMALA (1984) (tracing the troubled political history of Guatemala from colonial
times to the present).
99. See HANDY, supra note 98, at 124-25 (explaining the increase in tolerance
and numbers of unions prior to the coup of 1954); GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 7
(noting that 536 unions were registered with the Guatemalan Government at the time
of the coup in 1954).
100. GOLDTON, supra note 95, at 6.
101. See HANDY, supra note 98, at 5-9 (discussing Guatemala's repression of labor
unions).
102. See Goldston, supra note 95, at 147-54 (discussing the failure of labor law
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a brutal military campaign against
a small guerilla movement resulted in massive human rights violations
that were predominantly targeted against the indigenous peoples of the
highlands."u Estimates of the persons killed by the army or "disappearances" exceeded 100,000." In 1980, the police kidnapped seventeen
members of the executive board of the national trade union federation
who were never seen again."° Dozens of individual union leaders were
assassinated, and many went into exile due to death threats."
International concern and revulsion towards these practices in Guate-

mala led to the inauguration of a nominally civilian government in
1986.' With the advent of the Christian Democratic government of
Vinicio Cerezo came a new constitution that guaranteed the rights of
workers to organize and bargain." Guatemalan labor activists responded by increasing activity, forming new unions, and seeking to bargain

with employers."° But physical assaults, threats, relaxed enforcement of
labor laws, a hostile judiciary, and continued employer resistance to
unions frustrated and wore down many labor activists."' Trade unionists continue to face accusations of links to the guerilla movement as

businesses employ tactics to frighten unionists and their co-workers to
abandon union organizing.'"
enforcement to protect "a substantially illiterate working population, scarred by years
of organized terror").
103. See AMERICAS WATCH, GUATEMALA: A NATION op PRsoERs 104 (1984)

(documenting the history and recent resurgence of human rights abuses in Guatemala
with emphasis on the developments following the coup of August 1983, when General
Mejia Victores seized power).
104. See id. at 16 (tabulating massive numbers of flagrant killings and disappearances); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEALA: INVESTIGATIONS INTO DISAPyEARANCES: THE INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION (1987) (reporting on Guatemalan disappbarances); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA TRADE UNIONISTS AND POLITICAL
AmviI
TARGETED UNDER THE NEw GOVERNMENT (1991) (addressing trade unionists as targets in Guatemala); and AMES
INTERNATIONAL, GUATEM.A IMPuNrrY:

A QUESTION OF POLrrICAL WILL (1993) [hereinafter GUAT MI.A IMPUNITY] (documenting the continued of human rights abuses of workers and other civilians).
105. GUATEUMAA IMPUNITY, supra note 104.
106. GUATEL.A IIPUNrrY, supra note 104.
107. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that the civilian government instituted in 1986 tolerates dissent).
108. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (discussing how the Christian Democratic Government is credited by most union leaders as easing constraints on unionizing).
109. Goldston, supra note 95, at 11.
110. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that union participants continue
to be persecuted, albeit to a lesser extent).
111. See GOLDSTON, supra, note 95, at 12 (discussing how many businesses in
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In the 1990 elections, conservative businessman Jorge Serrano ousted
the Christian Democratic administration and rose to the presidency in
January 1991. I2 Serrano campaigned on promises of economic development, especially in the maquila sector of factories that exported apparel and electronics goods, predominantly to the United States."3 A pro-

gram that began in the mid-1980s with just six factories employing
fewer than 2,000 workers grew to more than 275 factories and 50,000
employees by 1992.2" Fierce employer opposition to union organizing,
massive minimum wage and hour law violations, hazardous working

conditions, and use of child labor characterized the industrial relations in
this sector."5
2. Using the Labor Rights Clause of the GSP
United States labor rights advocates employed the Generalized System

of Preferences (GSP) as a means of addressing worker rights violations
in Guatemala."6 A 1986-87 General Review conducted by the United
States Trade Representative yielded no actionable basis in Guatemala." 7
The International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund and allied
United States union, church, and human rights groups filed petitions
every year to the United States Trade Representative calling for
Guatemala's removal as a GSP beneficiary country unless it consistently
respected labor rights." 8
In connection with each petition, the United States coalition sent a

Guatemala view unions as being part of the government's overall plan to destroy the
private sector); see also Petition to the United States Trade Representative: Labor
Rights in Guatemala (USTR 1989); Petition and Request for Review of the GSP Status of Guatemala (USTR 1990); Petition and Request for Review of the GSP Status
of Guatemala (USTR 1991); and Petition/Request for Review of the GSP Status of
Guatemala (USTR 1992) [hereinafter GSP Petitions] (discussing Guatemala's troubled
worker rights history and status with respect to the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP)).
112. See KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 3
(1992) (discussing the 1991 election of Jorge Serrano).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 32-33.
115. Id. at 3-4.
116. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988) (stating statutory rubric that United States
follows with regard to Guatemala and the GSP).
117. GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 156-57.
118. See GSP Petitions, supra note IlI (emphasizing the prevalence of flagrant
human rights abuses in Guatemala).
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delegation to meet with workers, union leaders, church leaders, United
States embassy officers, and Guatemalan government officials (including,
in 1988, then-President Vinicio Cerezo)." 9 United States delegations
met with factory owners and plantation managers, with officials of the
Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, and with the heads of the maquila

sector promotional group." The labor rights delegation gathered information for its petition, and pressed for improved protection of worker
rights. 2 ' Similarly, invited by their United States counterparts, Guatemalan unionists sent delegations to the United States to meet with labor,

church, human rights, community organizations, as well as United States
Government
officials to discuss labor rights and labor conditions in their
2
country ,1

Although the first four GSP petitions filed by United States labor
rights advocates from 1988 to 1991 carefully detailed assassinations,
arrests and torture of trade union activists, repressive provisions of the
Guatemalan Labor Code, and non-enforcement of worker protection

laws, the interagency committee that considers GSP worker rights petitions failed to accept the petitions for review. Despite this failure, the
cycle of delegations, petitions, and rejections created a dynamic of increasing pressure on the Guatemalan government and employers to avert

trade sanctions for worker rights violations.' " Allowing the Guatemalan

119. See Labor Groups Say They Will Ask USTR to Deny GSP Benefits to Guatemala, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (May 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File (discussing the actions of labor groups following a week-long visit to
Guatemala).
120. See Trish O'Kane, Vice President Moves to Take Power in Guatemala, S.F.
CHRON., June 3, 1993, at A8 (discussing how Chamber of Commerce leaders feared
greatly the loss of United States trade benefits under the GSP equaling approximately
$160 million per year in tariff-free Guatemalan exports); see also Charges Fly at
Guatemala Trade Hearings; Labor Conditions Disputed at U.S. Government Hearings
on Revoking Guatemala's Generalized System of Preference Trade Status, WWD Capital Cities Media, Oct. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS. Nexis Library, OMNI File [hereinafter Guatemala Charges] (noting that Pharis Harvey, a member of the International
Labor Rights and Education Research Fund, testified that violence and worker abuse
mark Guatemala's maquila sector).
121. See Guatemala Charges, supra note 120, at 30 (discussing the actions of
such United States labor groups as the AFL-CIO and the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, who pressed for United States and Guatemalan Government involvement to correct current problems).
122. Guatemala Charges, supra note 120, at 30.
123. See O'Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (emphasizing the importance of GSP
trade benefits to Guatemala).
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Government to recognize such pressure allowed the Government to
claim that it was "taking steps" under the GSP to afford labor rights
without making substantive changes. 4

The exchange of petitions and rejections in 1988 to 1991 also created
embarrassment for the United States Government, which found itself
having to devise increasingly contorted arguments to justify a refusal to
accept these petitions for review." Year after year, the Trade Policy
Staff Committee (TPSC) pointed to the introduction of a labor code
reform bill in the Guatemalan Congress as evidence of "steps" toward
worker rights enhancement, despite the fact that each year the reform
bill failed to pass and all parties acknowledged that it had no chance to
26

pass.1

In 1992, the persistent efforts of United States labor rights advocates
who pursued the GSP strategy proved fruitful.'" Following the submis-

sion of a new labor rights petition in June 1992, the Labor Rights Fund
and related union, church, and human rights groups organized letter-

writing campaigns among their grass roots members to the USTR urging
acceptance of the petition for further review in public hearings. At
the urging of petitioners, over one hundred members of the United

124. See O'Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (noting how, in one Guatemalan analyst's
opinion, meetings and negotiations that are beginning to take place between the
Chamber of Commerce, political parties and the popular movement in Guatemala are
only for the sake of appearances); see also PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 181 (discussing the requirement under the GSP that a country be "taking steps" toward worker rights to maintain beneficial tariff treatment).
125. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 157 (discussing how the decision to reject
the petitions violated the spirit of the law by not allowing information to flow to the
U.S. Trade Representative as Congress intended). Furthermore, the refusal to review
the petition allowed for GSP trade benefits to remain intact in the face of violations
of labor rights, which clearly violated the statute. Id.
126. See, e.g., 1990 GSP Annual Review; Workers' Rights Review Summary; Petitions Not Accepted for Review (USTR 1990) (asserting that "the Government of Guatemala is actively pushing the passage of the code").
127. USTR Accepts 20 Petitions in 1992 Annual GSP Review, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (denoting that
the USTR accepted the GSP petition for 1992 to determine whether to suspend
Guatemala's GSP benefits).
128. See Letter from Stephen Coats, Executive Director, U.SJGuatemala Labor
Education Project, to Mickey Kantor, USTR (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Letter to
USTR] (on file with the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund)
(urging the USTR to extend the review by six months in order to assess adequately
whether the GSP benefits for Guatemala should be suspended based upon evidence
that efforts to improve labor rights have been demonstrative and not substantive).
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States Congress responded by writing to the USTR calling for acceptance and review."

Like its predecessors, the 1992 GSP labor rights petition cited continued attacks and threats against trade unionists, labor code provisions that
run afoul of International Labour Organisation Conventions, non-enforcement of minimum wage and hour laws, widespread child labor abuses,
and life-threatening health and safety hazards." Much of the petition

focused on conditions in the burgeoning maquila sector, with special
attention given to the large number of Korean-owned apparel manufacturing factories. 3 ' Evidence assembled by petitioners reflected massive
minimum wage violations, use of child labor, health and safety hazards,
and illegal crushing of efforts by workers to form unions."

The GSP petition created an uproar in Guatemala, shattering expectations that it would be treated, as in previous years, by being sloughed

off with a few minor "steps" toward labor rights. Employers, government spokespersons, and the press complained of United States interference in the sovereign affairs of Guatemala, and warned of dire economic
consequences if the United States sought to apply labor rights sanctions." Guatemalan union leaders who had cooperated with United

129. See Letter from Members of Congress to Ambassador Carla Hills (July 30,
1992) (on file with the ILRERF, Washington, D.C.) (requesting the USTR to review
the petition on labor rights in Guatemala).
130. See GSP Petitions, supra note 111 (noting that the 1992 petition was filed
by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), the United
States/Guatemala Labor Education Project (U.SJGLEP). the United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the International Union of Food and
Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), the International Union of Electronics Workers
ME), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the National Council
of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Human Rights Office).
131. See PErERsEN, supra note 112, at 137 (noting that fifty of the largest
maquila sector factories are owned by Korean investors). Promoters of export-led
development in Guatemala held out the Korean "economic miracle" of the 1970s and
1980s as a model for Guatemala. Id.
132. See Petition/Requestfor Review of the GSP Status of Guatemala Under GSP
Worker Rights Provisions 20-23, 26-28, 31-35 (June 2, 1992) (citing examples of
labor violations in Guatemala).
133. See Boicot al Gobiern o a los Guatemaltecos? [Boycotting the Government
or the Guatemalans?] EL GRAFICO (Guatemala City), June 16, 1992, at 8 (stating that
"Eso es lo absurdo de los norteamericanos cuando meten sus narices en los asuntos
internos de otros pueblos .... Si hay un pueblo que ha sido a to largo de su

historia violador de los derechos humanos, ha sido los Estados Unidos.) [This is the
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States labor rights delegations and had come to Washington to testify at
the GSP hearing received renewed death threats."

Despite such fulminations, Guatemala was anxious to avoid sanctions.
The government and employers moved quickly, settling a number of
longstanding labor disputes and amending the labor code with provisions

sought over time by trade unions.'35 Included in the reform was a simplification of union organization and strengthening of enforcement mea-

sure for violators."
There were three possible results from the petition/hearing process
under the GSP labor rights clause. The first view determined that Guatemala was "taking steps" to afford internationally recognized worker

rights, and thus would be entitled to remain in the GSP program.'37 In
contrast, if Guatemala were not taking steps, it would be removed from
GSP beneficiary status." Lastly, Guatemala could be "pended," or

placed on "continuing review" status.'39 In this last scenario, Guatemala
would remain in the GSP program, but the United States would closely

monitor it to ensure that Guatemala makes improvements in labor rights
and working conditions."" If Guatemala failed to make such improvements, the United States would apply sanctions. 4
Although there was progress in specific labor disputes, unions whose

applications for legal recognition had been delayed for months were
finding themselves quickly certified and permitted to function. Some

absurdity of the Americans, who stick their noses into the internal affairs of other
countries . . . . If there is one country that has been throughout its history a violator
of human rights, it has been the United States].
134. See Jared Kotler, Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, MIAMI
HERALD (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993 at 1lA (claiming threats against union leaders).
135. See United States Department of State, Cable from United States Embassy in
Guatemala, Labor Code Amendments: Review and Analysis (Dec. 22, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with ILRERF) (listing changes in the labor code).
136. See id. (stating that reforms have clarified the union organization process and
increased penalties for violators); see also Guatemala: Labor Code Meets First Test,
BULL. DEPT. INT'L AFF., AFL-CIO, Feb. 1993, at 5 (reporting a case which tested
positively the effectiveness of the stronger enforcement of the new labor code).
137. See Kantor Underscores Workers Rights in announcing 1992 GSP Results,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 28, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File (discussing requirements of GSP status).
138. Id.
139. See Nicholas Petche, Guatemala City, UPI, Mar. 28, 1993, § Domestic News
(discussing review options for the U.S. Government under the GSP).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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difficult collective bargaining conflicts were settled with reasonable
compromises and finally, labor code reforms were enacted." Insisting
on strict, immediate application of the trade sanctions against Guatemala
posed a danger to the lives of those trade unionists closely allied with

United States petitioners.' 3 In March 1993, petitioners and Guatemalan
unionists jointly called for a six month "continuing review" in the forthcoming announcement by USTR of the decision on Guatemala,' " dated

April 1, 1993. For unrelated reasons, the USTR delayed the announcement of the GSP labor rights decisions. This delay, coupled with the

subsequent dramatic turn of events in Guatemala, made the GSP labor
rights petition a pivotal issue affecting the fate of constitutional order in
Guatemala."
On May 25, 1993, President Jorge Serrano dissolved the Guatemalan
Congress and Supreme Court and suspended constitutional rights." He

made charges of corruption in Congress and warned
"destabilizing" demonstration activity by trade unionists and
organizations." The Guatemalan military initially announced
for the auto-golpe (self-coup) and Serrano."
Union

against
popular
support
leaders,

farmworkers, and community activists took extraordinary security measures, fearing a return to mass arrests or worse atrocities."

The Serrano self-coup only lasted one week, as domestic and interna-

142. Fabiana Frayssinet, Guatemala: Workers Trapped in a Legal Labyrinth, ITE
PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 1992.
143. See Jared Kotler, Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, Ml, u
HERAM (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993, at 1IA (discussing threats to workers).
144. See Letter to USTR, supra note 128.
145. William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton Administration Passed the Test?, NOiSUR-LATIN AM. POL AFF., July 9. 1993, § Summaries & Analysis.
146. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Leader Is Pressed*to Yield Power N.Y. TIMS,
June 1, 1993, at A7.
147. Tim Golden, Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face. N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 1993, at A3.
148. IcL
149. David Scott Clark, Guatemalans and the U.S. Put Pressure on President to
Restore Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as U.S.
Places Aid and Trade Benefits Under Review. CHRisTImN SCI. MONWOR. May 28,
1993, at 7. As one commentator reported: "Union leaders are cautious. They want to
gauge how much international sympathy (and thus some measure of protection) there
is for direct action against Serrano . . . . 'We're not all meeting together, and we're
staying in different locations,' says Dino Arana of the Union of Guatemalan Workers." Id
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tional outcry forced him to abdicate." On June 1, 1993, his vice president, Gustavo Espina Salguero, announced his intent to assume the
presidency, again with the support of the military, but Espina lasted no
more than five days.' On June 5, 1993, the reconvened Guatemalan
Congress elected Ramiro Deleon Carpio, an independent human rights
special counsel and leading Guatemalan human rights advocate, as the
new president."
While the timing may have been coincidental, the pending decision on
Guatemala's GSP status proved to be a decisive policy tool for the
United States in influencing the restoration of constitutional rule and the
surprising accession of a promising human rights leader to the presidency.' At news of the coup, the United States labor rights petitioners
immediately met with USTR and State Department officials and demanded a removal of Guatemala's GSP benefits unless it restored constitutional rule." In response, the State Department issued a statement
that "unless democracy is restored in Guatemala, GSP benefits are likely
to be withdrawn."'5 5
Early press commentary cited the leverage in the GSP decision:
But perhaps more damaging to the local economy and Mr. Serrano's
cause could be the call by U.S. labor rights groups to revoke Guatemalan
industry's tariff-free access to the United States market for certain products .... Guatemala's labor practices are already under review by the
United States Trade Representative's office .... Given Serrano's suspen-

sion of the right of public protest and strikes, analysts expect U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor to consider terminating Guatemala's trade
benefits."

150. Tim Golden, Guatemala's Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIMES,

June 3, 1993, at A3.
151. Guatemala: Serrano Ousted from Power, Congress elects Ramiro de Leon

Carpio as President, NoTlSuR-LATiN AM. POL. AFF., June 11, 1993, § Party Politics
& Elections.
152. Id.
153. William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton Administration Passed the Test?, NOiSuR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., July 9, 1993, § Summaries & Analysis.
154. See U.S. Aid Freeze on Guatemala to Stay for Now, REUTERS, June 2, 1993,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (discussing the interruption of aid
after the coup).
155. Jared Kotler, Keep the Ecomonic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders, MIAMI HER-

ALD (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993, at 11A.
156. David Scott Clark, Guatemalans and the U.S. Put Pressure on President to
Restore Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as U.S.
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The New York Times also noted the impending labor rights sanctions
as critical to Serrano's fate, reporting that on the day before his abdication, "businessmen have panicked at a threat by the United States to
withdraw Guatemala's trade benefits under the Generalized System of
Preferences."' A controlling factor lending to Serrano's downfall was
the concern of Guatemala's business leaders that rising exports to the
United States and Europe could be devastated if the United States imposed the threatened sanctions. Within hours of the United States' threat
to cut Guatemala's trade benefits, business leaders who had previously
supported authoritarian rule began pressing government and military
officials to reverse Mr. Serrano's action."
Continual pressure quickly ended the Espina presidency bid, facilitated
a clean break with military-dominated governance of Guatemala's ruling
elite, and resulted in the inauguration of Deleon Carpio as President on
June 6, 1993.' On June 25, United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor announced that Guatemala would remain a GSP beneficiary
country at least during a six month "continuing review" period: "If
countries fail to make substantial concrete progress in addressing worker
during this time, their GSP benefits will be in serious
-rights concerns
'6
jeopardy."'
In addition to the labor rights issue, the conclusion of Guatemala's
Ambassador to the United States who opposed the coup is similarly
important: "The true heroes of the drama are the Guatemalan people,
who simply would not permit the trashing of their constitution - a
constitution owed to thousands and thousands massacred, kidnapped,
tortured and disappeared ....Their response to the coup was a virtual
revolution.'. The GSP labor rights petition, however, was still a for-

Places Aid and Trade Benefits Under Review. CHRISnAN Scl. MONITOR, May 28,
1993, at 7.

157. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Leader Is Pressed to Yield Power, N.Y. TIms,
June 1,1993, at A7.
158. Tim Golden, Guatemalan Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face, N.Y. TIIES,
June 3, 1993, at A3.
159. George Rodriguez, Guatemala: Hunted Official Now Governs his Former
Hunters, INmR PRESs SERvICE, June 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File.

160. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Kantor Announces
Results of 1992 GSP Reviews: Emphasis on Worker Rights Is Underscored, No. 9342 (June 25, 1993) (press release).
161. Edmond Mulet, The Palace Coup 77Tat Failed, N.Y. IMEs, June 22, 1993, at
A23.
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tuitous policy instrument available at just the right time to have a pronounced effect on events in Guatemala."

This effect demonstrated the

potential power of international labor rights advocacy in a world marked
by the intertwining of national and regional economies with continuing
struggle for democracy and social justice."
3. Litigating Guatemala Labor Rights in United States Courts
As disputes over Guatemala's GSP status continued, United States
labor rights advocates turned to a new strategy to help end one of the
longest and most bitter labor disputes in Guatemala: using United States

courts as a forum for asserting international labor claims."
The dispute arose when a United States owner of Internacional de
Exportaciones ("Inexport", an apparel factory) fired the union leadership
committee and more than one hundred union supporters after they
formed a union in 1989 and demanded bargaining.'" The owner
claimed the unionists were communists and guerilla sympathizers'" and
hired armed guards to patrol the factory floor and frighten other workers
into submission.'" The guards also assaulted fired workers who staged
a protest at the factory gate.'"

The Inexport owner's actions violated both international labor
norms 169 and the Guatemalan labor code.'

In proceedings before the

162. See William I. Robinson, Guatemala's Failed Coup d'Etat: Has the Clinton
Administration Passed the Test?, NOTISuR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF., July 9, 1993, §
Summaries & Analysis (discussing Washington's great influence on the Guatemalan
political atmosphere).
163. Id.
164. See Memorandum from Kurt Petersen and Paul Sonn to Michael Ratner et al.
(Dec. 11, 1991) (on file with ILRERF) (discussing Inexport case and possible jurisdictions).
165. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. The factory was one of the largest garment making facilities in Guatemala, with over five hundred workers. Id. at 48. Established in the 1970s, the factory was later converted to maquila status under the
special maquila incentive laws passed in 1984 to enhance export-led development in
Guatemala. Id.
166. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
167. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
168. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 128-35.
169. See ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991 (1992) (including Convention No. 87 regarding freedom of
association, and Convention No. 98 regarding the right to organize collectively). Guatemala had ratified ILO Conventions guaranteeing the right of association and the
right to organize and to bargain collectively. Id.
170. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129-30 (stating that Guatemalan courts repeat-
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Labor Court of Guatemala, the workers won judicial orders for reinstatement and back pay. On appeal, the Labor Court upheld these orders."'
The company owners, however, never complied with the court orders,
and the courts never took steps to enforce their orders." Three years
after the firings, the workers still remained unemployed." United
States labor rights supporters first cited the Inexport case in GSP petitions, but the TPSC argued that the case had not yet been adjudicat74
ed.
Labor rights advocates, therefore, attempted to "bring the litigation
home" to courts in the United States.'" Lawyers and law students from
the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, the U.S.Guatemala Labor Education Project, the Center for Constitutional Rights
and the Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School, with pro
bono assistance from two Washington, D.C. law firms and attorneys in
Miami, Florida, devised a plan to sue the United States owner of the
Guatemalan factory on behalf of the fired workers.'
The United States "Inexport Team" traced the owner's sales and
distribution operations to find possible United States judicial forums
which had jurisdiction." They discovered that the company's distribution headquarters were based in Miami, Florida, and had substantial
funds in Florida banks. 78 They also learned that Inexport's largest customers were in New York City, the site of accounts payable to the
Miami sales office.
While the strategists examined the potential claims under international
labor rights norms, they decided instead to adopt a more prosaic cause
of action that arose often in the international business context: to enforce the judgment of the Guatemalan courts under established principles

edly have declared as illegal the retaliatory and violent actions taken by the owner of
Inexport).
171. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
172. PErERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
173. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 130.

174. See USTR, GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Worker
Rights Review Summary: Petitions Not Accepted For Review (Guatemala, 1990 &
1991) (on file with USTR and ILRERF) (indicating that the GSP subcommittee woudl
not consider the Inexport case as long as it was still being adjudicated in the Guatemalan courts).
175. Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to Michal Ratner et al.
Inexport Team (Dec. 22, 1991) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
176. Id
177. Id
178. 1&
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of comity rather than a vague claim that still-evolving international labor
rights norms were violated.'79 Although a United States" court could not
enforce a reinstatement order, it could satisfy the judgment of the Guatemalan courts by ordering back pay for the workers from the company
assets in the United States."w
In early 1992, the Inexport Team chose to pursue this route, and
drafted pleadings for submission to a Florida state court that targeted the
assets of the distribution company.' Team attorneys also prepared
pleadings to submit to a New York state court that would seek to garnish accounts payable to Inexport by New York customers of the company." Additionally, a delegation from the legal team visited Guatemala in March 1992, to secure certified judgment papers from the Guatemalan courts, to work with the union there to identify and consult
with named plaintiffs in the case, and to take affidavits from fired workt
ers.

8

In April 1992, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor convened new,
tripartite negotiations among the ministry, Inexport's owner, and the
union in an effort to resolve the dispute."8 The labor rights legal team
delayed filing the lawsuit to await the results of these negotiations.'
In July, the parties reached a settlement. The fired workers were reinstated, a schedule of back pay payments over a seventeen-month period
was implemented, and the union was recognized as the bargaining agent
for employees. "
CONCLUSION
These case studies of strategies and tactics developed by labor rights
advocates in the United States in connection with NAFTA, and in support of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, amount to a preliminary
survey of the field.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Inexport Team, Draft Pleadings for the Inexport Case (Apr. 15, 1992) (on file
with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
182. Id.
183. Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (undated) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
184. Memorandum from Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (July 27, 1992) (on
file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
185. Id.
186. Memorandum from Lance Compa to the Inexport Team (Sept. 1, 1992) (on
file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).

1993]

INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS

These accounts of actions by United States labor rights advocates on
behalf of workers and unions in the transnational economy, however, are
not intended to overstate their results. First, although the Clinton Administration did sign the labor agreement,'" critics contend that the
NAFTA text as it stands contains serious flaws: a secretive dispute resolution process that shuts out labor, environmental, and human rights
voices; imbalances in tariff reduction schedules that will accelerate United States and Canadian job losses; clauses that override efforts by state
and local governments to protect their citizens," and inadequate "side
agreements" on labor rights and labor standards."
Similarly, notwithstanding a series of concrete victories in Guatemalan
labor disputes, the military and the land- and business-owning elite
continue to dominate Guatemala. Similarly, fewer than six out of the
three hundred maquila factories in the export processing sector recognize
unions." United States and Guatemalan labor rights supporters, therefore, must continue to assist workers against what remains a constant,
defensive struggle against great odds.
The importance of these case studies lies in their evocation of the
possibilities for expanded labor rights advocacy in international trade.
The growing volume of labor rights controversies outlined in Part I, and
the growing number of arenas surveyed in Part II where labor rights
claims can be asserted and adjudicated in some form, with varying
degrees of effective enforcement, suggest how workers, unions, human
rights proponents, and other private labor advocates can become potent
actors in the transnational economy. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor
rights case studies show how at least some of these arenas can be used
to advance workers rights: labor standards in bilateral or multilateral
trade agreements; use of labor rights clauses in United States trade statutes; creative litigation strategies; invocation of ILO Conventions and
other international norms.
A strong, enforceable regime of international labor rights ensures, or

187. See Peter Behr, Kantor Pitches Trade Pact on Hill; Official Says NAFTA
Offers Many Benefits for United States Economy, Jobs, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993,
at A9 (describing USTR's promotion of NAFTA to legislators).
188. See NAFTA Supplemental Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm. (Mar. 11, 1993) (testimony of Pharis
Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund).

189. See LEVISON, supra note 80 (discussing the shortcomings of the labor side
agreement).

190. Interview with Stephen Coats, Executive Director, United StateslGuatemala
Labor Education Project (Mar. 20, 1993).
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at least tends to ensure, that competitive advantage derives from genuine, natural trade flows without being accelerated by exploitation. With
ample space for associating and organizing free of repression, workers
can protect their interests through collective bargaining with multinational employers and by pressing their own governments through a democratic political process for fair labor standards under domestic law. Aggressive international labor rights advocacy can force governments and
employers to take account finally for the interests, passions, and rights
of workers and their unions in making policy and investment choices in
the transnational economy.

